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IntroductionPart-01 
Conceptual Framework for Development:
Innovation, Coordination, and Governance Externalities
 Development: Three Externalities
 Development is conceptualized as the result of synergies between enhanced 
human capital and new knowledge, involving complementary investments in 
physical and social capital.  
 The fundamental policy challenge is for the state to work with non-state actors 
and markets to address innovation and coordination externalities as well as 
governance externalities (e.g., incompetence and corruption).   
 “Modern Growth”: Three Breakthroughs
 Emergence of a large group of people who absorb and assimilate knowledge to 
improve their human capital and in turn use their improved human capital to 
apply and generate knowledge to raise productivity (Lucas 2009)
 Expansion of markets and hierarchies to facilitate specialization and coordinate 
productive activities, through the invisible hand (Smith 1776) and the visible 
hand (Chandler 1977)
 Emergence of meritocracy (careers open to talent) and responsive and 
accountable governance  (popular will and checks & balances)
Alternative Development Paradigms
 Endowment Perspective: Framework Approach (Liberalization)
 Economies with “appropriate endowments” (cultural values, institutions, “investment climate”) 
grow.  Those lacking such endowments do not.
 Examples: Protestant ethic, common law, and colonial legacies
 The state should focus on getting the institutional framework right and then get out of the way.  
Release market forces and let individuals play the game.
 Bootstrapping Perspective: Ingredients Approach (Capacity Development)
 Initiating growth does not require state-of-the-art institutions.  The challenge is not so much to 
get growth to start by adopting big-bang reforms, as it is to sustain it by devising search 
networks to detect and mitigate constraints as they emerge.
 The state should facilitate growth by supplying the missing ingredients, which are often 
characterized by externalities.  Retain ownership and progressively develop local capacity.
 The reinforcement of successful experiments through the feedback mechanism of performance-
based rewards can lead to dramatic changes over time.
 While a regime that facilitates resource mobilization can be effective in a catch-up phase of 
development, an institutional platform that fosters autonomy, diversity, and experiment is critical 
to sustained productivity-led growth.
* Note: Differences in the two development paradigms largely reflect differences in assumptions about the 
relative magnitudes of innovation and coordination externalities on the one hand and negative 
governance externalities on the other.
Historical Growth Experience: 
Stagnation, Divergence, and Convergence?
Source: Maddison (2006: 642)
Per Capita GDP of Various Regions (in 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars) 
 Until the Industrial Revolution, the world’s per capita GDP grew at an annual average of 
0.05%, which meant that per capita GDP would double every 1,400 years.  The world 
was stuck in low income.
 Starting with the Industrial Revolution, the average annual growth rate of per capita 
GDP in Western Europe and its offshoots increased to 1% in the 19th century and 2% in 
the 20th century.
 Japan and several other latecomers have managed to reduce the income gap with the 
West, but  most developing countries have failed to do so.
Source: Ohno (2009: 8)
Capabilities, Learning, and Ownership: 
Overcoming the Middle Income Trap
Basic education, health, and stability are important for growth and vice versa. Integration into a
regional or international production network can bring in much needed investment and know-how.
However, to generate high and sustained growth, a country must retain ownership of its
development and progressively build up its capacity to add value and manage risks even as it
engages in external interaction to narrow the knowledge gap.
Developing countries typically start their industrialization in the assembly & production segment of the 
value chain, using their comparative advantage in labor-intensive manufacturing (e.g., garments).  Only 
a few manage to move to higher value-added segments along the value chain (e.g., R&D and marketing) 
as well as shift up to higher value-added sectors (e.g., machinery & equipment).  Close consultation 
between the government and the private sector is key to solving information and incentive problems in 
this stage, when countries try to upgrade their comparative advantage.  
Value Chain: Moving along and Shifting up
Product Space: Diversification, Sophistication 
(Upgrading), and Connection (Deepening)
• Product space can be arranged 
like a forest:
– A sparse periphery where 
products connect poorly with 
others
– A dense core where products 
are produced with capabilities 
used in other products as well
• Development involves 
producing new things
– Countries tend to move 
through the product space by 
developing goods they 
currently produce
– Countries can move from the 
periphery to the core “only by 
traversing empirically 
infrequent distances” 
Source: Hidalgo, Klinger, Barabasi, and Hausmann (2007)
Industrial Policy: Literature Review
Schools Insights on sector identification and promotion
Developmental state 
(Johnson 1982; Amsden
1989; Wade 1990)
Government picks winners (in consultation with 
business).
Rent-seeking
(Krueger 1974)
Government can’t and shouldn’t pick winners.
(Self-fulfilling incompetence and corruption?)
Self-discovery
(Rodrik 2007)
Winners pick themselves, with help from search 
and problem-solving networks.
New structural economics
(Lin and Monga 2010)
Latecomers can pick winners in mature industries 
by benchmarking early movers (based on CA).
Product space
(Hidalgo et al. 2007)
Winners are readily identifiable, but how do we go 
from the periphery to the core?
Strategic risk-taking Winners are readily identifiable, but the key is 
to take strategic risks, weighing the challenges of 
skill accumulation, scale economies, and 
complementary investments against the possibility 
of capacity underutilization and financial distress.
 Outward-Oriented, Bottom-up, Integrated Industrial Policy
 Discover latent and potential comparative advantage through 
experimentation and international benchmarking.  
 Positively reinforce successful experiments and phase out unsuccessful 
experiments by providing performance-based rewards.
 Systematically study what has to be done to fill the missing links in the 
domestic value chain and move up the quality ladder, and make 
concerted efforts to aim for international competitiveness from the outset.
 Take strategic risks, weighing the challenges of skill accumulation, scale 
economies, and complementary investments against the possibility of 
capacity underutilization and financial distress. 
 Inward-Oriented, Top-down, Ad Hoc Industrial Policy
 Promote upstream industries with large spillovers (“Big Push” through 
coordinated domestic industrialization).  
 Go top-down.  Disregard feedback.
 Problem: Insufficient Demand, Suboptimal-Scale Plants, Higher Costs, 
Monumental Projects
Industrial Policy Approaches
Korea retained the ownership of its export-oriented industrialization and
progressively developed its own capabilities to add value and manage risks
even as it actively learned from, and engaged with, the outside world.
Korea’s Experience with Industrial PolicyPart-02 
Resource Endowment and Institutional Infrastructure:
Historical Hindsight SWOT Analysis for the 1950s
 Egalitarian and Cohesive Society: Implications for HRD
 Cultural and Ethnic Homogeneity
 Land Reform and War
 Abundance of Cheap Educated Labor: Latent Comparative Advantage
 High Level of Education Relative to Income: Equivalent to Education Level in Countries with 
2 or 3 Times Korea’s Per-Capita Income
– Primary Enrollment Rate: from under 30% (pre-1945)  to  95 % (1959)
– High-School Enrollment Rate: from 3% (1951) to 20 % (1959)
 Market Economy with Structural Distortions
 Birth and Growth of Businesses
 Entry Barriers and Import Restrictions
 Lack of Capital
 Low Domestic Savings
 Limited Access to FDI and Foreign Loans
 Rapidly Expanding and Integrating Non-Communist Market
 Geopolitical Uncertainty
 Communist Threat
 Korea as “Too Important to Fail” during the Cold War?
Human Resource Development: 
School Enrollment and Per Capita Income
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Korea invested in its people even when it was quite poor. Prior land reform, war, and
flattening of the traditional hierarchy created expectations for social mobility conducive to
human resource development. Universal primary education greatly increased the
number of enrolled students at all levels, but did not raise per capita income until
complementary developments in industrial and trade policy took place.
Source: Center for Education Statistic Information (http://cesi.kedi.re.kr)
 Two-Tier Approach to Coordination and Innovation
 Government: National-Level Coordination and Innovation
 Chaebol: Group-Level Coordination and Innovation
 Big-Push Partnership: Information and Risk Sharing
 International Trade as an Essential Component
 Coordination
 Scale Economies: Overcoming the Limits of Domestic Market
 Market Test and Reward Based on Performance in a Competitive Setting: 
Less Prone to Political Influence and Manipulation 
 Learning by Exporting: Upgrading Mechanism
 Containment of Corruption and Rent-Seeking
 Changes in Political Economy (1960-61)
 Meritocracy, Monitoring, and Incentives
Korea’s Big-Push Partnership: 
Government and Business Groups
Export-Oriented Industrialization: 
Secure Economic and Political Independence
 Centralization and Coordination of Economic Policymaking
 Establishment of the Economic Planning Board (EPB): Policy Coordination and 
Budgetary Powers with a Multi-Year Horizon 
 Five-Year Plans and Monthly Meetings: Blueprint, Implementation, and Feedback
 Nationalization of Commercial Banks
 Adjustment of Macroeconomic Variables
 Devaluation of the Korean Currency (KRW/USD: 130         255 in 1964)
 Adjustment of the Interest Rates (15%         30% in 1965)
 Reinforcement of Experiments through Performance-Based Rewards
 Support Contingent on Performance in Competitive Markets (L/C-Based Financing)
 State Guarantee to Foreign Financial Institutions on Private-Sector Debt
 This state guarantee became effective after Korea established a track record of earning hard 
currency through exports and paying back foreign loans.
 The state guarantee was extended to foreign financial institutions providing loans to Korean 
firms, not to their owner-managers, but subsequent developments blurred this distinction. 
Heavy and Chemical Industry Drive:
Increase Local Value-Added and 
Establish Defense Industry
1972 1976 1981
GNP per capita $302 $488 $983
HCI Share in Manufacturing Value-Added 35.2% 41.8% 51.0%
HCI Share in Manufacturing Exports 27.0% 44.0% 60.5%
Source: HCI Promotion Planning Board, cited in K. Kim (1988).
Targets: $10 billion in exports and $1,000 in per capita income by 1981
Foreign Capital Domestic Capital Total Percent Share
Iron and Steel
Non-Ferrous Metals
Machinery
Shipbuilding
Electronics
Chemicals
1,502
222
1,049
416
593
1,523
674
123
1,137
352
599
662
2,176
345
2,186
768
1,192
2,158
22.7
3.6
22.8
8.0
12.4
22.8
Sub-Total 5,305 3,547 8,852 92.3
Others 468 273 741 7.7
Total 5,773 3,820 9,593 100.0
(million US 
dollars)
Instead of setting up armories or factories for specific weapons, Korea established 
dual-use industrial complexes, with a target production ratio of 70 percent civilian and 
30 percent military in peacetime.
“Exportization of All Industries”
“Heavy and Chemical Export Promotion”
For Korea, export development-- for which the nation continuously has had to 
measure itself against global benchmarks-- has been the engine of growth and the 
organizing principle under which industrial upgrading, infrastructure development, 
and human resource development could be pursued. Korea promoted heavy and 
chemical industries with a view toward securing international competitiveness from 
the outset; they were not just for domestic demand.
“Scientification of All People”
“Flag-Bearer for the Nation’s Modernization”
Question circa 1970: “To raise the share of the domestic value-added in exports
and stay ahead of late-developing countries, Korea must upgrade its industries,
but do the Korean people have the right national character to succeed in
sophisticated industries?”
Policymakers had initial doubts, but these young students showed the answer
was positive.
공 업 입 국 장 기 계 획
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The Dominican Republic had a large and increasing comparative advantage in sugar  in the 
early 1970s, when its per capita GDP was on par with Korea’s.  Its garment exports began 
to take off in the 1980s thanks to free trade zones, but the domestic value-added was limited.
Revealed Comparative Advantage:
CA-Conforming or CA-Defying or Something More?
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Korea had a strong and increasing comparative advantage in light industries when it 
made its strategic gamble to promote heavy and chemical industries in 1973, after 
benchmarking advanced industrial nations with similar natural endowments as Korea’s.
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Thailand had a strong comparative advantage in rice and other raw materials in the 
early 1970s.  It subsequently developed the garment and electronics industries, taking 
part in the regional division of labor in Asia. 
Japan
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Japan had a significant but declining comparative advantage in light industries in the 
early 1970s.  It upgraded its comparative advantage in sophisticated industries with 
high value-added.
IT Industry Promotion: Forge Ahead in 
New General-Purpose Technology
 Institutional Architecture for IT Promotion after the HCI Drive
 Targeting IT: Reserved EPB, HCI-Focused MCI, and Weak MPC    
 Office of the Presidential Secretary for Science and Technology
 Corporatization of the Korea Telecommunication Authority (from MPC)
 Public-Private Consultation and Value Chain Expansion
 Deregulation: TV and Telephone Sets 
 Demand Creation through Procurement: National Backbone Information System
 Collaborative R&D: TDX, Semiconductors, and Computers
 Outward-Oriented, Bottom-up, Integrated Approach
 Focus on International Competitiveness
 (Absorptive) Capacity Development, Technology Licensing, and Innovation
 Merit-Based Appointments and Performance-Based Rewards
Diversification into High Value-Added Areas:
LG Story
-My father and I started a cosmetic cream factory in the late 1940s.
-At the time, not one company could supply us with plastic caps of adequate 
quality for cream jars, so we had to start a plastics business. Plastic caps 
alone were not sufficient to run the plastic molding plant, so we added combs, 
toothbrushes, and soap boxes.
-This plastics business also led us to manufacture electric fan blades and 
telephone cases, which in turn led us to manufacture electrical and electronic 
products and telecommunications equipment.
-The plastics business also took us into oil refining, which needed a tanker 
shipping company.
-The oil refining company alone was paying an insurance premium amounting 
to more than half the total revenue of the largest insurance company in 
Korea. Thus, an insurance company was started.
-This natural step-by-step evolution through related businesses resulted in the 
Lucky-Goldstar (LG) group as we see it today. 
The chaebol and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) served as centers of local capacity 
development and external interaction.  They were willing to pursue vertical integration 
and related diversification on their own, but usually worked in conjunction with 
government policy when they ventured into unrelated industries.
Shift to Competition and Corporate 
Governance Policy
Part-03 
 From Extra-Market Arrangements to Market Mechanism
 Development of economic institutions and increasing viability of market 
transactions: Erosion of the efficiency rationale for business groups 
 Pyramiding of business groups: Entrenchment of the families and undue 
concentration of economic power
 Shifting power balance in favor of business groups: Potential for rent-
seeking and moral hazard
 Danger of Premature Adjustment: Any remaining efficiency advantages?
 From a Developmental State to a Market Economy
 Credible Signal for a Regime Change: How to end “Too Big to Fail”
 Liberalization and Democratization
 Removal of Entry Barriers vs. Exit Barriers
 Money Politics vs. Civil Society
 Explosive Combination
 Strong Expectations for Government Protection Against Bankruptcies  
 Weakening of  Government Control
Problem of Transition: Whether and 
How to End the Big-Push Partnership
 Partial Reform
 Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA) of 1980
 Industrial Development Law of 1986: Horizontal Industrial Policy
 Continued Government Control of “Privatized” Banks
 Interest Rate Liberalization
 Asymmetric Liberalization
 Rise of Non-Bank Financial Institutions (NBFIs) under Chaebol Control
 Widening Gap Between Ownership and Control
 De-Control without De-Protection
 Deregulation > Prudential Regulation
 Capital Account Liberalization
Partial Reform and Asymmetric Liberalization
 Resolution of Legacy Costs
 Injection of public funds to clean up non-performing loans
 Pursuit of accountability for fraud and incompetence
 Structural Reform
 Enhancing prudential regulation
 Reducing moral hazard: massive corporate failures as credible signals
 Strengthening competition: FDI and FTC
 Improving corporate governance
 Enhancing labor market flexibility and social safety net 
Post-Crisis Reform
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Korea’s Experiences with Financial Crises
ConclusionPart-04 
Development 
Stage
1960s
Support Export 
Development
- MOST/KIST
- S&T 
Promotion Act
- Five-Year 
Economic Plan 
Including S&T
1970s
Promote Heavy 
and Chemical 
Industries
- Government 
Research 
Institutes
- Technical and 
Vocation 
Schools
- R&D 
Promotion Act
- Daedeok 
Science Town
1980s
Shift from 
Industry 
Targeting to R&D 
Support
- National R&D 
Plan
- Private Sector 
Initiatives in 
R&D
1990s
Provide 
Information 
Infrastructure and 
R&D Support
- Informatization 
- E-Government
- GRI 
Restructuring
- U-I-G 
Linkages
2000s
Promote New 
Engines of 
Growth and 
Upgrade R&D
- Universities’ 
Leading Role
- Efficient NIS
- RIS and 
Innovation 
Clusters
Industrial 
Policy
S&T 
Policy
Factor-Driven Investment-Driven Innovation-Driven
Korea’s Transition Toward a Knowledge Economy
Korea’s transition toward a knowledge economy was intimately linked to export
promotion, industrial upgrading, and human resource development, and institution-
building was largely complete by the end of the 1980s.
Korea’s R&D Expenditure Trends
Source: World Bank (2007).
Source: Ministry of Science and Technology, Bank of Korea
Per capita GDP (constant 2000 US$)
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Exposed to global competition, private-sector companies came to realize that innovation 
was key to their prosperity and dramatically increased their R&D expenditures. 
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Business Expenditures on R&D:
From Assimilation to Innovation 
Not only did Korean firms increase BERD as a share of sales, but they also increasingly 
conducted their own R&D instead of just relying on technology licensing.  As a result, 
royalty payment as a share of BERD tended to decrease over time.
Global R&D Landscape in 2010
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
1 Iron Ore Textiles Textiles Electronics Semiconductors Semiconductors
2
Tungsten 
Ore
Plywood Electronics Textiles Computers Ships
3 Raw Silk Wigs
Iron and Steel 
Products
Footwear Automobiles Phones
4 Anthracite Iron Ore Footwear
Iron and Steel 
Products
Petroleum Products
Petroleum 
Products
5 Cuttlefish Electronics Ships Ships Ships Automobiles
6 Live Fish
Fruits and 
Vegetables
Synthetic 
Fibers
Automobiles
Wireless 
Telecommunication 
Equipment
Liquid Crystal 
Devices
7
Natural 
Graphite
Footwear
Metal 
Products
Chemicals Synthetic Resins
Auto Parts and 
Components
8 Plywood Tobacco Plywood General Machines
Iron and Steel 
Products
Plastic Products
9 Rice
Iron and Steel 
Products
Fish Plastic Products Textiles
Org. & Inorg. 
Compounds
10 Bristles Metal Products
Electrical 
Goods
Containers Video Devices
Electronic 
Appliances
Korea’s Top 10 Exports: 
Evidence on Industrial Upgrading 
Sectoral Composition of Korea’s GDP
Source: Bank of Korea, National Account (http://ecos.bok.or.kr).
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Any More Room for Manufacturing Structural 
Transformation?: Value Added and Employment
The Superstar model: Low FDI, high R&D, 
high royalty payments 
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 Policy Approaches to Business Groups
 Latin America: Rent-Seeking by business and political elites
 Sweden: Grand Bargain between social democrats and business groups
 U.S. and Britain: Anti-Pyramiding through inter-corporate dividend taxes 
and strict takeover rules
 Korean Characteristics 
 Chaebol, exposed to global competition, as “dancing elephants”
 Negative environment for innovative start-ups and open innovation
 Korean Approach 
 Outward-oriented, bottom-up, integrated policy
 Strengthening investor protections against “tunneling” and other abuses 
 Improving innovation ecosystem by strengthening intellectual protection, 
competition, and access to finance
Future Policy Challenges
